THE FOUNDERS ON: “DOES THE CONSTITUTION
WORK?”
Craig A. Stern*
Does the Constitution work? An odd question to ask while
Congress meets, the President acts, federal judges sit, the states are at
peace, and the borders are (somewhat) secure. Nevertheless, remarks of
the Founders strongly suggest that the Constitution does not work. That
is, it does not meet the goals it set for itself. If the Constitution does not
work, this fact would be important to know. And if the goals the
Constitution set for itself are sound, failure to meet them should provoke
some change in affairs. Posing and answering the question whether the
Constitution works is more than academic.
What then is the Constitution to effect beyond the operation of the
federal government and the union of the states? Two answers to this
question predominate. 1 The first is that the Constitution is to secure
liberty, broadly understood. 2 Unconvinced as we are of ultimate good,
at least as a polity, we require a constitution to mediate among
competing interests and so allow each of us the broadest mutual sway. 3
This liberal answer 4 has the Constitution maximize individual freedom. 5
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1. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary, What Is Republicanism, and Is It Worth
Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695 (1989); James A. Gardner, Can Party Politics Be Virtuous?,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 667 (2000); Timothy L. Hall, Religion and Civic Virtue: A Justification of
Free Exercise, 67 TUL. L. REV. 87 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public
Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); Steven M. Tipton, Republic and Liberal State: The Place of
Religion in an Ambiguous Polity, 39 EMORY L.J. 191 (1990).
2. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Federalism as a Structural Threat to Liberty, 22 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 67, 71 (1998) (“The Constitution protects liberty against government and against
concentrations of power within government.”).
3. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (the U.S. Constitution was ordained, partly, to “establish Justice”
and “insure domestic Tranquility”).
4. See Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication,
72 VA. L. REV. 543, 561 (1986) (“Based on the ‘psychology of temptation and the politics of
suspicion, the Constitution of 1787, and especially the Bill of Rights of 1789, represent a triumph of
modern liberalism over classical republicanism.”).
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Depending upon how this freedom is defined, the Constitution does
seem to work, at least in some measure.
Competing with this liberal answer is that of republicanism. The
Constitution is not chiefly to maximize individual freedom, as if
freedom were its own end and all freedoms were equally worth
promoting. Rather, the Constitution is to foster virtue in citizens.6
Harking back to the mainstream of the Western political tradition, the
republican answer holds that there is indeed reliable knowledge of the
human good, and that this good, to the extent it may be effected by a
political ordering, is the chief object of the Constitution. 7 Being
governed by the Constitution and, especially, participating in the civic
life it establishes, are to cultivate virtue.8 Recent scholarship suggests
that the Founders embraced republicanism at least as much as
liberalism. 9 And, as with liberalism, the Constitution seems to work to
some extent to achieve the republican end.
So whether to achieve the liberal or the republican end, the
Constitution appears to work in some measure. It appears to secure
liberty. 10 To a lesser extent, it appears to foster virtue. 11 How much it
5. Justice O’Connor has stated that “[o]ur Constitution is designed to maximize individual
freedoms within a framework of ordered liberty.” Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
6. See, e.g., Brent Adams, Feature, Law Day Address: May 1, 1996: The Pursuit of Virtue, 4
NEV. LAW. 26, 27 (June 1996) (“The purpose of our Constitutional government is to create the
freedom for citizens to pursue virtue, not just to accumulate property.”); Gardner, supra note 1, at
668 (“One of the Framers’ paramount goals was to create the conditions in which political virtue
could flourish.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1559
(1988) (arguing that “the framers did not abandon the traditional republican belief in deliberative
government and the need for civic virtue” when designing the Constitution”).
7. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 685, 729 (1992) (“Republicanism, however, is not essentially about countering egoism; its
claim is that public spirit (not altruism) is the path to the human good and that politics is the unique
forum in which to cultivate it.”).
8. See id.; Adams, supra note 6.
9. William Michael Treanor, Fame, The Founding, and the Power to Declare War, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 695, 736 (1997); see also Stephen A. Siegel, The Marshall Court and
Republicanism, 67 TEX. L. REV. 903, 914 (1989) (reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE 181535 (1988)) (stating that “[m]ost historians concede that republicanism played an important role in
revolutionary thought”).
10. See, e.g., D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 616 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment
protects the right to bear arms for self-defense independent from any service in the military); Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983)
(stating that, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, an individual “may not be detained even
momentarily without reasonable, objective grounds for doing so”).
11. The government’s protection of rights such as trial by jury, freedom of assembly, and
private property can be understood as promoting the republican goal of virtue. Sunstein, supra note
6, at 1562-63; see also Daniel F. Piar, Morality As A Legitimate Government Interest, 117 PENN ST.
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actually works towards these ends is uncertain. Also uncertain is which
of these ends is correct, or whether some other end altogether is correct.
But how then to establish whether the Constitution works?
A pauper may find that the Great Seal works for cracking nuts, but
the pauper does not thereby find that the Great Seal works. This analogy
suggests a wholly different way to determine whether the Constitution
works. If one were to know that the Great Seal were designed to serve
the Lord Keeper or Lord Chancellor, and were to know how these
gentlemen were expected to act, one might very well determine whether
the Great Seal works. Instead of determining more abstractly what
might be the purpose of the Great Seal and whether it successfully serves
that purpose, one might determine for whose hands the Great Seal was
made and whether it is being used by those hands. Used by hands for
which it was not designed, it is unlikely to be working. While the
pauper held the Great Seal, it was not sealing documents of state.
Unless in the hands for which it was designed, it did not work.
The ultimate end of the Constitution, and to what extent it achieves
those ends, may be uncertain. But far less uncertain are the hands for
which it was designed.
While our country remains untainted with the principles and manners
which are now producing desolation in so many parts of the world;
while she continues sincere, and incapable of insidious and impious
policy, we shall have the strongest reason to rejoice in the local
destination assigned us by Providence. But should the people of
America once become capable of that deep simulation towards one
another, and towards foreign nations, which assumes the language of
justice and moderation while it is practising iniquity and extravagance,
and displays in the most captivating manner the charming pictures of
candor, frankness, and sincerity, while it is rioting in rapine and
insolence, this country will be the most miserable habitation in the
world; because we have no government armed with power capable of
contending with human passions unbridled by morality and religion.
Avarice, ambition, revenge, or gallantry, would break the strongest
cords of our Constitution as a whale goes through a net. Our
Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people. It is
12
wholly inadequate to the government of any other.

L. REV. 139, 164 (2012) (“Over the course of the last century, constitutional adjudication has had a
homogenizing influence on American life, particularly regarding questions of civil rights, which
often invoke moral issues.”).
12. John Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade of the Third Division of the Militia of
Massachusetts (Oct. 11, 1798), in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES 228, 228-29 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1854).
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President Adams, writing in 1798, was certain that the Constitution
presupposes citizens both moral and religious. 13 It was made for such,
and without them the Constitution does not work.
That “[o]ur Constitution was made only for a moral and religious
people” 14 is plainly the truth. Many statements from many Founders
demonstrate their belief that such a people is necessary to the operation
of any republic. 15 “It was axiomatic for . . . nearly all the founders, that
virtue and therefore religion were necessary conditions for republican
government. This was so because virtue was thought to be necessary for
maintaining republican liberty, and religion in turn was thought to be
necessary for virtue.” 16 In 1776, Adams himself had written privately,
Who would not Exchange the discordant Scenes of Envy, Pride,
Vanity, Malice, Revenge, for the sweet Consolations of Philosophy,
the serene Composure of the Passions, the divine Enjoyments of
Christian Charity, and Benevolence? Statesmen my dear Sir, may plan
and speculate for Liberty, but it is Religion and Morality alone, which
can establish the Principles upon which Freedom can securely
stand . . . . The only foundation of a free Constitution, is pure Virtue,
and if this cannot be inspired into our People, in a greater Measure,
than they have it now, They may change their Rulers, and the forms of
Government, but they will not obtain a lasting Liberty. They will only
exchange Tyrants and Tyrannies. You cannot therefore be more
pleasantly, or usefully employed than in the Way of your Profession,
pulling down the Strong Holds of Satan. This is not Cant, but the real
17
sentiment of my Heart.

Adams’s view of the Christian religion as a support for republican
government was also commonplace. For example, Noah Webster wrote

13. And these citizens are apparently in both respects very unlike those of Revolutionary
France.
14. Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade, supra note 12, at 229.
15. See, e.g., JOHN WITHERSPOON, The Dominion of Providence Over the Passions of Men,
in THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF JOHN WITHERSPOON 126, 144 (Thomas Miller ed., 1990) (“[H]e is
the best friend to American liberty who is most sincere and active in promoting true and undefiled
religion, and who sets himself with the greatest firmness to bear down profanity and immorality of
every kind. Whoever is an avowed enemy of God, I scruple not to call him an enemy to his
country.”); Hall, supra note 1, at 106-07; Geoffrey R. Stone, The World of the Framers: A Christian
Nation?, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22-24 (2008).
16. JEFFRY H. MORRISON, JOHN WITHERSPOON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 28 (2005); see also Michael W. McConnell, Religion and Its Relation to Limited
Government, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 943, 947 (2010) (“Republican government, almost
everyone agreed, required a degree of public virtue, and the only way most people could imagine
inculcating public virtue was through religious teaching.” (footnote omitted)).
17. Letter from John Adams to Zabdiel Adams (June 21, 1776), in 9 THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 399, 401 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1854).
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[T]he Christian religion is the most important and one of the first
things in which all children under a free government ought to be
instructed. No truth is more evident than that the Christian religion
must be the basis of any government intended to secure the rights and
18
privileges of a free people.

Perhaps the locus classicus on the Founders’ belief that citizens of a
republic must be moral and religious is in Washington’s Farewell
Address of September 17, 1796:
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity,
Religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that
man claim the tribute of Patriotism, who should labour to subvert these
great Pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of
Men and citizens. The mere Politician, equally with the pious man
ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all
their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be
asked where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the
sense of religious obligation desert the oaths, which are the
instruments of investigation in Courts of Justice? And let us with
caution indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained
without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of
refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience
both forbid us to expect that National morality can prevail in exclusion
of religious principle.
‘Tis substantially true, that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of
popular government. The rule indeed extends with more or less force
to every species of free Government. Who that is a sincere friend to it,
can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the
19
fabric.

The Founders seemed convinced that a republic requires a moral and
religious people.
18. NOAH WEBSTER, Reply to a Letter of David McClure, Esq., on the Subject of Proper
Course of Study in the Girard College, Philadelphia (Oct. 25, 1836), in A COLLECTION OF PAPERS
ON POLITICAL, LITERARY AND MORAL SUBJECTS 291, 291 (1843); see also Letter from Noah
Webster to James Madison (Oct. 16, 1829) (on file with Library of Congress, Madison Papers,
Series 2) (“[T]he Christian religion . . . is the basis, or rather the source, of all genuine freedom in
government . . . I am persuaded that no civil government of a republican form can exist and be
durable in which the principles of Christianity have not a controlling influence.”); cf. Letter from
John Marshall to Jasper Adams (May 9, 1833), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JOHN MARSHALL 278 (Charles
Hobson ed., 2006) (“[W]ith us, Christianity and religion are identified. It would be strange, indeed,
if with such a people our institutions did not presuppose Christianity and did not often refer to it and
exhibit relations with it.”).
19. Washington’s Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 2 AMERICAN POLITICS (NONPARTISAN) FROM THE BEGINNING TO DATE 14, 19 (Thomas Valentine Cooper & Hector Tyndale
Fenton eds., 1888).
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If so, for what other sort of people would they have adopted the
Constitution? The Constitution they certainly thought created a
republican form of government. 20 If they thought as well that republics
need a moral and religious people to operate successfully, they must
have presupposed such a people for the Constitution. Consequently,
“[o]ur Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people.” 21
Especially interesting evidence of this presupposition of a moral
and religious people comes from an unlikely source, James Madison of
The Federalist.
Madison’s political theory emphasizes political
structures that minimize the effect of human faults, or that direct these
faults toward the common good. 22 For (perhaps the most famous)
example, Federalist 10 explains how the Constitution dilutes the baleful
effects of faction. Similarly, Federalist 51 explains how the separation
of powers established by the Constitution uses a less-than-noble human
self-interest to keep powers in check:
[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who
administer each department, the necessary constitutional means, and
personal motives, to resist encroachments of the others. The provision
for defence must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate
to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition. The interest of the man, must be connected with the
constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human
nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of
government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all
reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external
nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control
the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the
government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of
23
auxiliary precautions.

Human imperfection is to offset human imperfection. But note also the
20. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (reading
“[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government”).
21. Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade, supra note 12, at 229.
22. Recent scholarship questions the generally accepted notion that many Framers shared this
theory. See Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611 (1999).
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 268-69 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001) (emphasis added).
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“dependence on the people.” This “primary control on the government”
operates, though the people themselves also be actuated by base
sentiments. But the people must not be actuated by them alone:
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind, which requires a certain
degree of circumspection and distrust: so there are other qualities in
human nature, which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these
qualities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures
which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us,
faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be, that
there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that
nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from de24
stroying and devouring one another.

Republican government depends upon virtue in its citizens. Or at least,
the Framers thought so. 25 If they thought so, they wrote the Constitution
for citizens they would have thought moral and religious.
Because the Framers and the other Founders thought a moral and
religious people necessary to any republican government, they thought
such a people necessary to the republican government they adopted with
the Constitution: And so, “[o]ur Constitution was made only for a moral
and religious people.” 26 But were the Founders right to think such a
people necessary for a republican government, including their own? If
they were not right, Adams erred when he wrote that the Constitution “is
wholly inadequate to the government of any other” than a “moral and

24. THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, supra note 23, at 291 (James Madison). Madison dilated at the
Virginia Ratifying Convention:
I have observed, that gentlemen suppose, that the general legislature will do every
mischief they possibly can, and that they will omit to do every thing good which they are
authorised to do. If this were a reasonable supposition, their objections would be good. I
consider it reasonable to conclude, that they will as readily do their duty, as deviate from
it: Nor do I go on the grounds mentioned by gentlemen on the other side—that we are to
place unlimited confidence in them, and expect nothing but the most exalted integrity
and sublime virtue. But I go on this great republican principle, that the people will have
virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom. Is there no virtue among us?
If there be not, we are in a wretched situation. No theoretical checks—no form of
government can render us secure. To suppose that any form of government will secure
liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea. If there be
sufficient virtue and intelligence in the community, it will be exercised in the selection of
these men. So that we do not depend on their virtue, or put confidence in our rulers, but
in the people who are to choose them.
James Madison, Address to Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 20, 1788), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’
CONSTITUTION 409 (William T. Hutchinson et al. eds., 1987).
25. See, e.g., Adams to Zabdiel Adams, supra note 17; THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (James
Madison).
26. Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade, supra note 12, at 229.
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religious people.” 27
Americans have long shared the Founders’ view that the
Constitution requires a moral and religious people. 28 Until yesterday,
American education, for example, was ordered toward producing such
citizens as necessary to American constitutionalism. 29 The republican
freedom and limited government secured by the Constitution have long
been thought to depend upon widely held moral and religious scruples.
Alexis de Tocqueville, for example, observed in the second quarter of
the nineteenth century:
Up till now no one in the United States has dared to profess the maxim
that everything is allowed in the interests of society, an impious maxim
apparently invented in an age of freedom in order to legitimatize every
future tyrant.
Thus, while the law allows the American people to do everything,
there are things which religion prevents them from imagining and forbids them to dare.
Religion, which never intervenes directly in the government of American society, should therefore be considered as the first of their political
institutions, for although it did not give them the taste for liberty, it
singularly facilitates their use thereof.
The inhabitants of the United States themselves consider religious beliefs from this angle. I do not know if all Americans have faith in their
religion—for who can read the secrets of the heart?—but I am sure that
they think it necessary to the maintenance of republican institutions.
27.
28.

Id.
See, e.g., 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 724 (1833) (“Indeed, in a republic, there would seem to be a peculiar propriety in viewing
the Christian religion, as the great basis, on which it must rest for its support and permanence, if it
be, what it has ever been deemed by its truest friends to be, the religion of liberty.”); Hall, supra
note 1, at 108-12; James J. Knicely, High Wall or Lines of Separation?, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 261, 261-67 (1997); Tipton, supra note 1.
29. Cf. ANNE COLBY, ET AL., EDUCATING CITIZENS 25 (2003). Lee Shulman, in the
foreword to Educating Citizens, explains that the founding fathers “understood that if a democratic
society were to function as intended, as ‘a social compact, by which the whole people covenants
with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people,’ such covenants can only be entered into
by an educated citizenry.” Lee S. Shulman, Foreword to ANNE COLBY, ET AL., id., at vii, viii (citing
DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 221 (2001)). Modern approaches to education, however,
“stress the abilities to function in a culturally diverse, globally interdependent, technologically
sophisticated, and rapidly changing world.” ANNE COLBY, ET AL., supra, at 29. Consequently,
“[a]s American higher education has evolved from the eighteenth century to the present,
moral and civic concerns have moved from its center, inherent in the very concept of a
college education, to its margins, segregated from the rest of academic life. If these
trends prevail, education for responsible citizenship could be squeezed out altogether, at
least in some kinds of institutions.
Id. at 25.
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That is not the view of one class or party among the citizens, but of the
30
whole nation; it is found in all ranks.

Like the Founders, generations of Americans have thought a moral and
religious people necessary to the Constitution. 31 If they have been
correct, and if the American people are not moral and religious, a
necessary conclusion is that the Constitution does not work.
It could be difficult to prove these premises—that the Constitution
requires a moral and religious people, and that the Americans are not
such people (at least now). Instead of proving them, let us take them as
plausible and look for telltale signs of their truth. If the American
people were not moral and religious as required ex hypothesi, what
failures would appear in the workings of the Constitution?
Here again President Adams’s letter of 1798 suggests a path for
inquiry. 32 Much like the passage above from Tocqueville 33 of two
generations later, Adams’s letter observes that “we have no government
armed with power capable of contending with human passions unbridled
by morality and religion. Avarice, ambition, revenge, or gallantry,
would break the strongest cords of our Constitution as a whale goes
through a net.” 34 The limited republican government of the Constitution
leaves much to self-government. 35 Without the strictures of morality
strengthened by religion, a people would be intractable for the civil
government established by the Constitution. 36
A difficulty with framing such a failure of the Constitution solely in
these terms is that to do so disparages the governments of the states.
Especially as Adams and other Founders would have viewed matters, the
states are the primary civil governments to take up the slack of selfgovernment. 37 The federal Constitution supplies “cords” only secondary

30. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 292-93 (George Lawrence trans.,
J.P. Mayer ed., 1969) (1850).
31. See Hall, supra note 1, at 98 (stating that “American political discourse has never
completely divorced itself from appeals to the common good and to the virtues that make such a
good accessible”).
32. Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade, supra note 12.
33. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 30.
34. See Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
35. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”).
36. See Mark A. Noll, The Election Sermon: Situating Religion and the Constitution in the
Eighteenth Century, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1223, 1242 (2010) (stating that “[a]lmost all of the
Founders presupposed that government under the Constitution would prosper only so long as
morality, backed by religion, remained strong among the people at large”).
37. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 295 (1936) (“The determination of the
Framers Convention and the ratifying conventions to preserve complete and unimpaired state self-
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and few as against human passions rampaging at large. 38 Private failure
of self-government is of more concern to the states than to the federal
government. 39
But there is a kind of failure of self-government that is of grave
concern to the federal government. Again, Adams points the way. The
play of the human passions of which Adams warns is not so much
private as public. He warns of following French revolutionary footsteps,
footsteps of national error more a feature of civil government than a
force outside it. 40 The passion to be feared is a passion that distorts and
abuses civil government itself. 41 The cords of the Constitution at risk
are the cords that direct and limit the federal government. Adams and
his fellows feared Caesars. Morality and religion would suppress
Caesars 42 and keep up the supply of (effective, if miniature) Catos and
Ciceros. 43
If such constitutional cords were to work only with a moral and
religious people, what breaks in the cords would be expected in the
absence of such a people? Perhaps most obvious would be breaches of
explicit constitutional limitations. If our present Constitution, despite its

government in all matters not committed to the general government is one of the plainest facts
which emerges from the history of their deliberations. And adherence to that determination is
incumbent equally upon the federal government and the states. State powers can neither be
appropriated on the one hand nor abdicated on the other.”); see also Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S.
15, 44 (1885) (“The right of local self-government, as known to our system as a constitutional
franchise, belongs, under the constitution, to the states and to the people thereof, by whom that
constitution was ordained, and to whom, by its terms, all power, not conferred by it upon the
government of the United States, was expressly reserved.”).
38. See A.E. Dick Howard, Garcia and the Values of Federalism: On the Need for A
Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 19 GA. L. REV. 789, 789 (1985) (“Drawing on the lessons
of history, [the Founders] sought to give the central government sufficient authority to deal with
such national concerns as commerce among the states, while dispersing power in such a way as to
protect individual liberty and local self-government—two of the ends for which the war of
independence had been waged.”).
39. “The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.” THE
FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 23, at 241 (James Madison).
40. See Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
“Ahead of anyone in the [United States] government, and more clearly than any, Adams foresaw the
French Revolution leading to chaos, horror, and ultimate tyranny.” DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN
ADAMS 418 (2001).
41. For example, Adams despised political parties and warned that such factions could
silence moral citizens who truly sought to serve in an honest manner. Id. at 422.
42. “Statesmen, my dear Sir, may plan and speculate for liberty, but it is religion and
morality alone, which can establish the principles upon which freedom can securely stand.” Adams
to Zabdiel Adams, supra note 17, at 401.
43. For Adams there was no statesman greater than Cicero. MCCULLOUGH, supra note 40, at
375.
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amendments—most notably the Fourteenth 44 and the Seventeenth45—is
taken to be close enough to the Constitution of which Adams spoke,
present breaches might corroborate Adams’s claim. One might well
ponder whether the enumerated powers carry much of a negative
implication any more. 46 The commerce clause springs to mind, for
example. 47 Are the avarice and ambition in a people lacking morality
and religion behind the breaking of such cords?
Cords of constitutional limitation are the most obvious to be at risk
of breaking by a people of passions ungoverned by morality and
religion. But they are not the only cords of the Constitution at risk.
Cords direct towards desired ends as well as away from undesired
means. So another sign of lacking a necessary moral and religious
people may be cords broken by passions that misdirect government
under the Constitution so that ends go unattained.
While continuing to prescind from identifying the ultimate ends of

44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
As adopted, the first eight amendments to the Constitution applied only to the federal government.
See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833) (“Had the framers of these amendments
intended them to be limitations on the powers of the state governments, they would have imitated
the framers of the original constitution, and have expressed that intention.”). Since the passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment, however, many of these rights have been extended to apply with equal
force to the various states through the Due Process Clause. Robert R. Baugh, Applying the Bill of
Rights to the States: A Response to William P. Gray, Jr., 49 ALA. L. REV. 551, 569 (1998).
The Supreme Court’s application of the Bill of Rights to the states has been a major blow to
federalism, wresting from states the deference and flexibility they previously had enjoyed. Justin F.
Marceau, Un-Incorporating the Bill of Rights: The Tension Between the Fourteenth Amendment and
the Federalism Concerns That Underlie Modern Criminal Procedure Reforms, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1231, 1232-33 (2008); also see Louis Henkin, “Selective Incorporation” in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74, 88 (1963) (arguing that selective incorporation has
created “rigidities and runs counter to the direction of growth of the Constitution to embody flexible
standards permitting the increase of individual safeguards with the growing enlightenment of
contemporary civilization”).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
As originally constructed under the Constitution, “[t]he Senate was not intended to be the people’s
representative body, but that of the states.” Charles C.W. Cooke, Repeal the 17th Amendment!,
REVIEW
ONLINE
(March
1,
2013),
at
NATIONAL
http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/341894/repeal-17th-amendment-charles-c-w-cooke?
Senators were essentially obligated to vote in a manner consistent with the views of their state
legislature or else they were putting at risk their re-election by that legislature. Douglas Laycock,
Notes on the Role of Judicial Review, the Expansion of Federal Power, and the Structure of
Constitutional Rights, 99 YALE L.J. 1711, 1737 (1990). The ratification of the Seventeenth
Amendment put an end to this system “of federalism and bicameralism which had previously
checked expansionist federal activity.” Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The
History of the Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165, 233 (1997).
46. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57-74 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
47. See id.
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the Constitution in our inquiry on whether the Constitution works,
identifying mediate ends may help in our testing for a mismatch between
the Constitution and the people it governs. If a failure to achieve some
particular mediate end is a failure to be expected from lacking a
necessary moral and religious people, Adams’s claim will have garnered
further support, and a more general failure from that lack may be
expected.
The Constitution itself proclaims its ends in the Preamble:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish
48
this Constitution for the United States of America.

Are any of these ends unfulfilled? The reader may doubt whether the
government under the Constitution establishes justice (in blocking state
response to the killing of a class of human beings? 49), insures domestic
tranquility (in precipitating financial collapse?50), promotes the general
welfare (in fomenting pork, earmarks, and similar methods to purchase
votes? 51), or secures the blessings of liberty to ourselves (in enforcing
stifling regulation and schemes of taxation? 52) and our posterity (in
saddling the costs of the welfare state upon the backs of generations to
come? 53). One may be sure that Adams and his fellows would have
48. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
49. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
50. See, e.g., Dale Arthur Oesterle, The Collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Victims
or Villains?, 5 ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 733 (2010); David Reiss, The Federal Government’s Implied
Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s Obligations: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 42 GA.
L. REV. 1019, 1022 (2008).
51. See, e.g., Vincent Ostrom & Elinor Ostrom, Public Choice: A Different Approach to the
Study of Public Administration, 31 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 203 (1971); Dwight R. Lee, Politics,
Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 191 (1988).
52. See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro & Carl G. DeNigris, Occupy Pennsylvania Avenue: How the
Government’s Unconstitutional Actions Hurt the 99%, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 1085 (2012); Sarah E.
Shive, If You’ve Always Done It That Way, It’s Probably Wrong: How the Regulatory Flexibility
Act Has Failed to Change Agency Behavior, and How Congress Can Fix It, 1 ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J.
153 (2006).
53. See, e.g., Katherine Bradley & Robert Rector, Confronting the Unsustainable Growth of
Welfare Entitlements: Principles of Reform and the Next Steps, BACKGROUNDER (The Heritage
Foundation,
Washington,
D.C.)
(June
24,
2010),
available
at
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/bg2427.pdf; David Hartman, Stephen Moore &
Michael Tanner, The Work Versus Welfare Trade-Off: An Analysis of the Total Level of Welfare
Benefits by State, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 240 (Sept. 19, 1995), available at
http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa240.pdf.
Especially poignant regarding this solicitude for posterity in the light of current events are these
words from Joseph Story:
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doubted. 54 And if government under the Constitution is failing to fulfill
an end given in the Preamble, it would not be difficult to attribute some
of this failure to “human passions unbridled by morality and religion.” 55
Surely “[a]varice” and “ambition” 56 would have played substantial parts.
Such a failure to fulfill a mediate end would suggest a broader failure,
similarly engendered.
It is very likely that “cords of our Constitution” 57 have been broken.
It also is very likely that these cords would be more intact if we were “a
moral and religious people.” 58 The Constitution, then, governs a people
for which it is unsuited, a situation against which John Adams and other
Founders warned 59 and a situation portending a general frustration of the
ends of the Constitution. If so, the Constitution does not work, however
well it may appear to keep the peace and in fact keep offices filled.
Whether the Constitution works depends upon the purpose of its
working. Discerning that purpose, however, has resisted consensus.
Consequently, this article has suggested a roundabout way to supply at
least a tentative answer to the question whether the Constitution works.
The Founders believed that the Constitution, like any republican form of
government, would work only for a moral and religious people. 60 They
framed and adopted the Constitution in that belief. John Adams warned
that without morality and religion, the passions of the people “would
break the strongest cords of our Constitution.” 61 A glance at how some
cords have fared with a people very likely less than moral and religious
The last clause in the preamble is to “secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity.” And surely no object could be more worthy of the wisdom and ambition of
the best men in any age. If there be any thing, which may justly challenge the
admiration of all mankind, it is that sublime patriotism, which, looking beyond its own
times and its own fleeting pursuits, aims to secure the permanent happiness of posterity
by laying the broad foundations of government upon immovable principles of justice.
Our affections, indeed, may naturally be presumed to outlive the brief limits of our own
lives, and to repose with deep sensibility upon our own immediate descendants. But
there is a noble disinterestedness in that forecast, which disregards present objects for the
sake of all mankind, and erects structures to protect, support, and bless the most distant
generations.
1 STORY, supra note 28, at 485-86.
54. Adams assigned as the object of a legislature “to do strict justice at all times.” John
Adams, Thoughts on Government, in 4 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES 17, 195 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1854).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., Madison, Address to Virginia Ratifying Convention, supra note 24;
Washington’s Farewell Address, supra note 19.
60. See Adams to the Officers of the First Brigade, supra note 12.
61. Id.
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in the standards of the Founders has supplied some evidence that, more
generally, the Constitution does not work. The Constitution, broadly,
may not be suited to the people it governs. If so, whatever convenient
ends it may produce, it nevertheless does not work.

